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Selﬁsh Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games1
Subhash Suri,2 Csaba D. T´ oth,3 and Yunhong Zhou4
Abstract. We revisit a classical load balancing problem in the modern context of decentralized systems
and self-interested clients. In particular, there is a set of clients, each of whom must choose a server from
a permissible set. Each client has a unit-length job and selﬁshly wants to minimize its own latency (job
completion time). A server’s latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it grows linearly with (or, more
generally, as the pth power of) the number of clients matched to it. This interaction is naturally modeled
as an atomic congestion game, which we call selﬁsh load balancing. We analyze the Nash equilibria of this
game and prove nearly tight bounds on the price of anarchy (worst-case ratio between a Nash solution and
the social optimum). In particular, for linear latency functions, we show that if the server speeds are relatively
bounded and the number of clients is large compared with the number of servers, then every Nash assignment
approaches social optimum. Without any assumptions on the number of clients, servers, and server speeds, the
price of anarchy is at most 2.5. If all servers have the same speed, then the price of anarchy further improves
to 1 + 2/
√
3 ≈ 2.15. We also exhibit a lower bound of 2.01. Our proof techniques can also be adapted for
the coordinated load balancing problem under L2 norm, where it slightly improves the best previously known
upper bound on the competitive ratio of a simple greedy scheme.
Key Words. Load balancing, Congestion games, Price of anarchy.
1. Introduction. Consider a set U of n selﬁsh clients, each of whom must choose a
server from a set V, in the absence of a coordinating authority. There is a bipartite graph
G between U and V and a server j is permissible for client i only if (i, j) is an edge
in G. Each client has a unit-length job and selﬁshly wants to minimize its latency (job
completion time), and rationally prefers a fast server to a slower one. Servers can have
different speeds, and a server’s latency is inversely proportional to its speed, but it is an
increasing function of the server load (the number of clients served by it).
Each client independently trying to minimize its latency is essentially engaged in a
game with other selﬁsh clients. We call this the selﬁsh load balancing game. Unlike
traditionalloadbalancing,however,theclientsarenotinterestedinoptimizingthesocial
welfare(e.g.,totalsystem-widelatency).Instead,eachclienthasitsownprivateobjective.
The stable outcomes of these interactions are the Nash Equilibria—outcomes in which
no single client can improve its latency by switching unilaterally. Centralized optimal
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solutions, in general, are not stable—one or more clients may improve their latency
by switching, while worsening the latency for others. On the other hand, the cost of
Nash equilibrium solutions can be much worse than that of centralized outcomes, and
Papadimitriou [17] has coined the term “price of anarchy” to denote the worst-case ratio
between a Nash outcome and the social optimum. In this paper we give nearly tight
bounds for the price of anarchy in the selﬁsh load balancing game.
Nash equilibrium is a compelling solution concept for decentralized systems with
self-interestedplayers.Unfortunately,theconceptisdescriptive,notprescriptive:itdoes
not suggest algorithms for computing an equilibrium and computing Nash equilibria
remains a topic of current research. We, therefore, also investigate the following obvious
greedy strategy: clients arrive in the system online in an arbitrary order; upon arrival,
each client selects a permissible server with the least current latency, and this selection
is irrevocable. The greedy strategy is a myopic strategy—each client makes the best
choice available to it at the moment, although future choices by other clients may make
it regret that selection. While greedy does not generally lead to Nash solutions, it does
have the advantage of computational simplicity. Thus, a natural question to ask is: how
bad is the greedy assignment in the worst case?
The greedy strategy has been analyzed before in the context of centralized L2 norm
load balancing [4]—the goal there is to assign clients so as to minimize the L2 norm of
the server loads. Because the total latency of all the clients is intimately related to the
squared sum of the server loads, our techniques also lead to improved bounds for the
competitiveratioofthegreedyschemeof[4].Interestingly,theNashsolutionsarestrictly
better, suggesting the following conclusion: despite lack of central coordination, selﬁsh
players ﬁnd solutions that are better than greedy, which assumes centralized control but
non-selﬁsh players.
1.1. MotivationandModel. Ourloadbalancinggameisinspiredbytheemergingclass
of Internet-centric applications like the peer to peer (P2P) networks, but it has broader
implicationsforanyuncoordinateddistributedsystem.InaP2Psystem,forinstance,data
are often replicated to enable a high level of availability and fault tolerance. Thus, users
typically have the choice of many hosts from whom to download their data; each user
wants to minimize its own latency (time to download); and there is no central authority
to dictate a user’s choice.
An instance of the load balancing game is modeled as a bipartite graph G between a
set U of n clients and a set V of m servers. A client i can be assigned to server j only
if (i, j) is an edge in G. An outcome of the game is an assignment where each client is
assigned to one of its permissible servers. Suppose server j has speed σj and is matched
to j clients,thenweassumethattheresponsetime,orlatency,toeachclienti connected
to this server is λi = f ( j)/σj, where f is an increasing function of the load  j, and
σj is the speed of server j. In general, there are two distinct contributors to a client’s
latency: the server load and network congestion. In this paper we focus on the latency at
the server, and treat the network latency to be a constant. Because the network topology
as well as the IP route change continuously, the network latency is both unpredictable
and difﬁcult to model. One can incorporate a simpliﬁed network latency in our model
by folding it in the server speed—then a server with a fast connection to the network
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of the combined server and network latency seems challenging and is left for future
work.
The cost of an assignment M is the total latency of all the clients:
cost(M) =
n 
i=1
λi =
m 
j=1
 j f ( j)
σj
.
Under the linear model, the latency of server j is simply  j/σj. More generally, we
consider latency functions of the form  
p−1
j /σj, for any p ≥ 1. In that case the cost
of the matching is cost(M) =
m
j=1  
p
j /σj, which corresponds to the pth power of the
weighted Lp norm of the server loads.
A Nash equilibrium assignment is one in which no client can improve its latency by
unilaterally switching to another server. Let Mnash be a Nash solution, and let Mopt be
the (coordinated) social optimum. The price of anarchy is the worst-case bound on the
ratio between the costs of Mnash and Mopt.
1.2. Results. Our ﬁrst result concerns the price of anarchy with linear latency func-
tions. We show that if the server speeds are relatively bounded and the number of clients
is large compared with the number of servers, then every Nash assignment approaches
social optimum. Without any assumptions on the number of clients, servers, and server
speeds, the price of anarchy is at most 2.5. If all servers have the same speed, then we
can improve the upper bound to (1 + 2/
√
3) ≈ 2.15. We also give a lower-bound con-
struction showing that the price of anarchy can be at least 2.01, even with equal speed
servers and linear latency functions.
We next consider higher-order monomial latency functions. In this case we measure
the Lp normoftheserverloads,andshowthatthepriceofanarchyis(p/log p)(1+o(1)).
We then apply our technique to reanalyze a simple but centralized greedy scheme for
loadbalancing.ThebestresultknownforthisproblemisduetoAwerbuchetal.[4],who
show that the greedy scheme achieves the competitive ratio (1 +
√
2)2 ≈ 5.83 for the
squared L2 normoftheserverloadsevenfortheunrelatedmachinemodel.Weshowthat
if all jobs have the same size and the servers have arbitrary speeds in the related machine
model, then the competitive ratio of the greedy scheme is at most 17/3 ≈ 5.67; more
signiﬁcantly, if all the servers have the same speed, then we can improve the competitive
ratio to 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.24.
1.3. Related Work
Load balancing. The problem of assigning clients (jobs) to servers (machines) dates
backtotheearliestdaysofdistributedcomputingorscheduling,andthereisanenormous
literature on it. A small sample of these results includes the following: [12], [18], and
[23] investigate the online assignment of unit length jobs under the L∞ norm; [1] and
[14] consider ofﬂine assignments of unit length jobs; [2], [6], and [8] consider the
greedy assignment of weighted jobs under the Lp norm, where the client–server graph
is complete bipartite; [16] considers dynamic load balancing under the Lp norm. The
work most relevant to us is the L2 norm load balancing with an arbitrary client–server
graph [4]. Because the total latency of the clients is related to the squared L2 norm of82 S. Suri, Cs. D. T´ oth, and Y. Zhou
the server loads, the setting of Awerbuch et al. [4] can be viewed as the coordinated or
centralized version of our problem.
Congestiongames. Theloadbalancinggamebelongstothegeneralclassofcongestion
games introduced by Rosenthal [19] in game theory. In these games, a set of players
compete for a set of resources, and the cost of each resource depends only on the number
of players using it. A key game-theoretic property of these games is that they always
have at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Thus, in our work, we focus on pure
strategy Nash equilibria.
Selﬁsh routing. In network routing games, selﬁsh agents route their trafﬁc between a
source–destination pair in a network, where the network delay (latency) on each link is
determined by a monotone increasing function of the load through the link. The models
considered in the literature differ in many aspects.
The price of anarchy for maximal latency was considered by Koutsoupias and Pa-
padimitriou[13].Intheirmodelthenetworkconsistsofm paralleledgesbetweensource
and destination, and every agent can use any of the links. In [9] Czumaj and V¨ ocking
were able to prove tight bounds for this problem. Recently, Awerbuch et al. [5] and
Gairing et al. [11] have extended these results to a model where each agent can use only
a subset of the (parallel) links, namely, a permissible set, and Fotakis et al. [10] have
showed that the same bound holds in layered networks as well.
The price of anarchy for total ﬂow latency was considered by Roughgarden and
Tardos [22] and Roughgarden [20] in general networks. They obtained tight bounds
assumingnon-atomicagents,whereactionsofanindividualagenthavenegligibleimpact
on others. Roughgarden [21] extends these results to an atomic splittable model, where
agentscontrolapositivefractionofthetotaltrafﬁcbuteachuser’stask(ﬂow)canbesplit
arbitrarily across multiple paths. Our load balancing game, by contrast, is characterized
by atomic players and unsplittable jobs: There are ﬁnitely many clients, each of whom
is wholly assigned to a single server.
Similarly to our model, L¨ ucking et al. [15] studied the price of anarchy for total ﬂow
latency with unsplittable ﬂows. However, they consider only the special case where all
servers are permissible for every user. In their model they show that the price of anarchy
is less than 2, while we present a lower bound of 2.01 in the general case with arbitrary
permissible sets.
Sincetheconferencepublicationofourwork,Awerbuchetal.[3]and,independently,
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] have generalized our results to broader classes of
congestiongames.Awerbuchetal.[3]obtainedatightboundof2.5onthepriceofanarchy
for routing games in general networks with linear latency functions. Christodoulou and
Koutsoupias [7] discovered that the price of anarchy under linear latency functions is
at most 2.5 for certain congestion games where each player’s strategy is a subset of the
resources instead of a singleton set.
1.4. Organization. Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we establish two
key results (Nash Condition and Nash Inequality), which are central to our analysis. In
Section 3 we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy with linear latency functions,
and also show a lower-bound construction. In Section 4 we extend our analysis to the
latency functions under the Lp norm. In Section 5 we present our improved analysis ofSelﬁsh Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games 83
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Fig. 1. An instance (a), an optimal matching of cost 3 (b), and a Nash but not optimal matching of cost 5 (c),
assuming unit speed machines.
the greedy assignment scheme. Finally, we offer some conclusions and open problems
in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries. Our primary model is the linear latency model: if a server has load
  and speed σ then each of its   clients experiences latency λ =  /σ. If server j has load
 j and speed σj in an assignment M, then the assignment has cost
m
j=1  2
j/σj, which
is the weighted sum of the squares of server loads. We consider higher-order monomial
latency functions in Section 4.
An assignment is a Nash equilibrium if no single client can improve its latency by
unilaterally switching to another (permissible) server. Given an instance of the client–
server problem, let Mopt denote an assignment realizing the social optimum, and let
Mnash denote a Nash assignment. (See a small example in Figure 1.) For server j, let
Oj and Nj denote the set of clients assigned to j in Mopt and Mnash, respectively. We
use the shorthand notation oj =| Oj| and nj =| Nj| for the cardinalities of these
sets. The following lemma notes a simple but crucial condition imposed by a Nash
equilibrium.
LEMMA 2.1 (Nash Condition). Given an optimal assignment Mopt and a Nash assign-
ment Mnash, the following inequality holds for any two servers j,k, where σj,σ k are the
speeds of these servers:
nj
σj
≤
nk + 1
σk
if Nj ∩ Ok  =∅ . (1)
PROOF.I f k = j or Nj ∩ Ok =∅ , then the argument is trivially true, so assume
that k  = j and Nj ∩ Ok  =∅ . Pick an arbitrary client i ∈ Nj ∩ Ok. This client has
latency nj/σj in the Nash assignment Mnash. The server k is also permissible for i
because i ∈ Ok. By switching to k, client i can achieve latency (nk + 1)/σk. By the
equilibrium property, this latency is the same or worse than its latency in Mnash. Thus,
nj/σj ≤ (nk + 1)/σk.
This simple Nash Condition leads to the following important inequality, which is the
main basis for our upper bound analysis. (Later, we prove a similar inequality for the
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LEMMA 2.2 (Nash Inequality). Given an optimal assignment Mopt and a Nash assign-
ment Mnash, the following inequality holds:
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
(nj + 1)oj
σj
. (2)
PROOF. Sincethesets Ok,k = 1,2,...,m,partitionthesetofclients,wehavethatnj =
|Nj|=
m
k=1 |Nj ∩ Ok|, for every j. Similarly, we have ok =| Ok|=
m
j=1 |Nj ∩ Ok|,
for every k. Using these equalities, we can rewrite the total cost of a Nash assignment
as follows:
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
=
m 
j=1
nj
σj
m 
k=1
|Nj ∩ Ok|=
m 
k=1
m 
j=1
nj
σj
|Nj ∩ Ok|
≤
m 
k=1
m 
j=1
nk + 1
σk
|Nj ∩ Ok|=
m 
k=1
nk + 1
σk
m 
j=1
|Nj ∩ Ok|
=
m 
k=1
(nk + 1)ok
σk
.
Inthischainofinequalities,weusedthefactthat(nj/σj)|Nj ∩Ok|≤((nk+1)/σk)|Nj ∩
Ok| for all j,k. This is trivially true if |Nj ∩ Ok|=0; otherwise, it follows from
inequality (1).
Finally we present a technical lemma which is used later in Sections 3 and 5.
LEMMA 2.3. Let n,m be positive integers and let xj ≥ 0, σj > 0 for j = 1,...,mb e
arbitrary real values with
m
j=1 xj = n. Then the following inequalities hold:
m
j=1 xj/σj
m
j=1 x2
j /σj
≤
m +
m
j=1 σj
m
j=1 1/σj
2n
≤

1 +

max
1≤j,k≤m
σj
σk

m
2n
. (3)
PROOF. Let
f (x1,...,xm) ≡
m
j=1 xj/σj
m
j=1 x2
j /σj
and c(n,m,σ)≡
m +
m
j=1 σj
m
j=1 1/σj
2n
.
It is sufﬁcient to prove f (x1,...,xm) ≤ c(n,m,σ)because it immediately implies (3).
In the following we use the Lagrange multiplier method to prove that the maximum
value of f (x1,...,xm) is exactly c(n,m,σ)under the condition that
m
j=1 xj = n and
xj ≥ 0, j = 1,2,...,m.
Suppose that the maximum of f (x1,...,xm) is attained at x∗ = (x∗
1,...,x∗
m) where
there are m  coordinates x∗
i > 0. In the following we focus on the case where m  = m
as c(n,m ,σ)is maximized when m  = m. In other words, we can assume that x∗
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for j = 1,...,m. By the Lagrange multiplier condition, there exists a multiplier λ such
that
∂f (x∗
1,...,x∗
m)
∂xj
= λ, ∀j = 1,...,m.
Let A(x∗) ≡
m
j=1(x∗
j )2/σj and B(x∗) ≡
m
j=1 x∗
j /σj. The above equation can be
simpliﬁed to
A(x∗) − 2B(x∗)x∗
j = λA2(x∗)σj, ∀j = 1,...,m. (4)
Summing up these equations for j = 1,2,...m, we obtain
λ =
mA(x∗) − 2nB(x∗)
A2(x∗)

j σj
.
Substituting the value of λ into each equation of (4), we have
x∗
j =
A(x∗)
2B(x∗)
− σj

mA(x∗)
2B(x∗)

j σj
−
n

j σj

, ∀j = 1,...,m.
By plugging in the values of x∗
j for all j into A(x∗) and B(x∗),w eg e t
A(x∗) =
m 
j=1
(x∗
j )2
σj
=
A2(x∗)
4B2(x∗)


j
1
σj
−
m2

j σj

+
n2

j σj
,
B(x∗) =
m 
j=1
x∗
j
σj
=
A(x∗)
2B(x∗)


j
1
σj
−
m2

j σj

+
nm

j σj
.
Let z ≡ B(x∗)/A(x∗), and we get
z =
(1/2z)(

j(1/σj)

j σj − m2) + nm
(1/4z2)(

j(1/σj)

j σj − m2) + n2,
that is,
n2z2 − nmz −
1
4


j
1
σj

j
σj − m2

= 0.
Wesolve z fromtheaboveequationandobtain z = c(n,m,σ).Thiscompletestheproof
of Lemma 2.3.
3. Bounds on the Price of Anarchy. In this section we prove upper and lower bounds
on the price of anarchy. We prove three different upper bounds. The ﬁrst upper bound
(Theorem 3.1) is in terms of n (number of clients), m (number of servers), and the server
speeds. This bound is the sharpest in the limit when m/n → 0 and the ratio between the
maximum and the minimum server speeds is bounded. For instance, if all servers have86 S. Suri, Cs. D. T´ oth, and Y. Zhou
equal speed and m/n approaches 0, then Theorem 3.1 says that every Nash approaches
the social optimum. For arbitrary values of m, n, and server speeds, our second bound
(Theorem 3.2) is the best. It shows that the price of anarchy is at most 2.5 for any choice
of n, m, and server speeds. Finally, if all servers have the same speed, then Theorem 3.3
shows that the price of anarchy is at most (1 + 2/
√
3) ≈ 2.15. We also give a lower
bound construction showing that the price of anarchy is at least 2.01, even with equal
speed servers. (This lower bound dashed our original hope that the true price of anarchy
was 2.)
THEOREM 3.1. With linear latency functions, the price of anarchy is 1 + o(1) given
that n   m and server speeds are relatively bounded. Formally, the following is true:
cost(Mnash)
cost(Mopt)
≤ 1 +
m +
m
j=1 σj
m
j=1 1/σj
n
≤ 1 +

1 +

max
1≤j,k≤m
σj
σk

m
n
. (5)
PROOF. By using Nash Inequality (2) and the fact that njoj ≤ (n2
j + o2
j)/2, we get
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
(nj + 1)oj
σj
≤
m 
j=1
1
σj

n2
j + o2
j
2
+ oj

,
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
o2
j + 2oj
σj
,
cost(Mnash)
cost(Mopt)
=
m
j=1 n2
j/σj
m
j=1 o2
j/σj
≤ 1 + 2
m
j=1 oj/σj
m
j=1 o2
j/σj
.
By Lemma 2.3, we get the desired result immediately.
Next, we give an upper bound of 2.5 independent of n, m, and server speeds.
THEOREM 3.2. With linear latency functions and arbitrary values of n,m and server
speeds, the price of anarchy is cost(Mnash)/cost(Mopt) ≤ 2.5.
PROOF. Suppose that Mopt ={ Oj | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} is an optimal assignment and
Mnash ={ Nj | 1 ≤ j ≤ m} is a Nash assignment. Fix an index j, it is straightforward to
verify the following equality:
ojnj = 1
3n2
j + 3
4o2
j − 1
3(nj − 3
2oj)2.
The Nash Inequality (2) together with the above inequality implies the following:
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
njoj + oj
σj
=
m 
j=1
1
σj
(1
3n2
j + 3
4o2
j − 1
3(nj − 3
2oj)2 + oj),
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
1
σj
(9
8o2
j + 3
2oj − 1
2(nj − 3
2oj)2).Selﬁsh Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games 87
Thus, in order to show
m 
j=1
n2
j
σj
≤
5
2
m 
j=1
o2
j
σj
,
it sufﬁces to prove that
9
8o2
j + 3
2oj − 1
2(nj − 3
2oj)2 ≤ 5
2o2
j, ∀j = 1,...,m.
The preceding inequality is equivalent to the following simpliﬁed form:
oj(3 − 11
4 oj) ≤ (nj − 3
2oj)2.
It holds trivially if either oj = 0o roj ≥ 2. Because oj is an integer, thus the only
remaining case is oj = 1, and in this case the above inequality is equivalent to 1
4 ≤
(nj −3/2)2. Because nj is an integer, thus this holds, and the whole proof is complete.
3.1. An Improved Upper Bound for Equal Speed Servers. In this section we show a
furtherimprovementintheupperboundwhenallservershavethesamespeed.Theupper
bound in this case turns out to be 1 + 2/
√
3 ≈ 2.15, which is getting quite close to the
lowerboundof2.01,showninthenextsubsection.Withoutlossofgenerality,weassume
that all servers have the unit speed. Thus, cost(Mnash) =
m
j=1 n2
j and cost(Mopt) =
m
j=1 o2
j.
THEOREM 3.3. If all servers have equal speed and the latency function is linear, then
the price of anarchy is at most cost(Mnash)/cost(Mopt) ≤ 2/
√
3 + 1 ≈ 2.15.
PROOF. In order to prove the upper bound cost(Mnash) ≤ (2/
√
3 + 1)cost(Mopt),i ti s
enough to prove the following:
2
√
3
cost(Mnash) ≤

2
√
3
− 1

cost(Mnash) +

2
√
3
+ 1

cost(Mopt). (6)
By Lemma 2.2 together with σj = 1 and

j oj = n, we obtain that cost(Mnash) ≤
n +
m
j=1 njoj. To prove (6), it is thus sufﬁcient to show that
2
√
3

n +
m 
j=1
njoj

≤
m 
j=1

2
√
3
+ 1

o2
j +

2
√
3
− 1

n2
j

,
which is equivalent to the inequality
n ≤
m 
j=1

1 +
√
3
2

o2
j +

1 −
√
3
2

n2
j − ojnj

(7)
=
m 
j=1
√
3 + 1
2
oj −
√
3 − 1
2
nj
2
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Let xj = ((
√
3 + 1)/2)oj − ((
√
3 − 1)/2)nj, then (7) is equivalent to the following:
n ≤
m 
j=1
x2
j , with
m 
j=1
xj =
√
3 + 1
2
m 
j=1
oj −
√
3 − 1
2
m 
j=1
nj = n. (8)
We prove (8) by induction on m, which is also the number of pairs (oj,nj). The base
case, m = 1 is trivially true as x1 = n and n2 ≥ n because n is an integer. It is also easy
to verify for the case where m = 2 and there are two pairs (a,0) and (0,a). Now assume
that m > 1 and (8) holds for any m  < m.
If there is no j such that oj = 0, then n =
m
j=1 oj ≥ m, and thus
m 
j=1
x2
j ≥
(
m
j=1 xj)2
m
=
n2
m
≥ n.
Similarly the above inequality holds if there is no j such that nj = 0. Now suppose
that there is one pair (oj,nj) = (a,0) and another pair (ok,nk) = (0,b). Without loss
of generality, we assume that a ≥ b ≥ 1. If a = b, then we break the original prob-
lem into two subproblems, where the smaller one contains only two pairs (a,0) and
(0,a). The larger subproblem has m − 2 pairs. By induction, the inequality holds for
both subproblems. If a > b, then
m
j=1 x2
j decreases if we break (a,0) into two pairs
(a − b,0) and (b,0). Now we remove two pairs (b,0) and (0,b) to get a subprob-
lem with m − 1 pairs. So that by induction (8) holds. This also completes the whole
proof.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 uses solely the Nash Inequality (2) and
m
j=1 oj = m
j=1 nj = n. For assignments satisfying these constraints (but are not necessarily
Nash), the bound of Theorem 3.3 is the best possible. The following set of pairs (oj,nj),
for j = 1,2,...,m, attains this bound (the values nj, however, do not correspond to a
Nash solution): Let n = a+b+k and m = a+k +1. Consider a pairs of (1,0), k pairs
of (1,1), and one pair of (b,a +b). Setting k = (a −1)(a +b),w eh a v en = a(a +b)
and

j n2
j =

j ojnj + n.N o w

j n2
j 
j o2
j
=
k + (a + b)2
a + k + b2 =
2a2 + 3ab+ b2 − a − b
a2 + ab+ b2 − b
.
Let b/a approximate (
√
3 − 1)/2. As a goes to inﬁnity, the above ratio approaches
1 + 2/
√
3.
3.2. A Lower Bound. We now describe a construction showing that the worst-case
price of anarchy is at least 2.01. Our lower bound holds even if all servers have equal
speed.
THEOREM 3.4. In the worst case the following lower bound holds for the price of
anarchy:
cost(Mnash)
cost(Mopt)
> 2.01.Selﬁsh Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games 89
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Fig. 2. Our construction for k = 3 and (o0,o1,o2,o3) = (1,1,1,1): an optimal assignment (left) and a worst-
case Nash assignment (right). Complete bipartite subgraphs of G between groups are indicated by dashed
lines.
PROOF. We ﬁrst describe a general family of instances of the load balancing game with
a parameter k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. We then present one speciﬁc instance in this family for k = 7
which provides a lower bound of 2.01.
Consider an integer k ∈ N, k ≥ 2, and let Sk be the set of all monotone increasing
sequencess = (o0,o1,...,ok) ∈ Nk+1,where1 ≤ o0,ok < k,andoi−1 ≤ oi ≤ oi−1+1,
for i = 1,2,...,k. We construct a bipartite graph G = (U,V) for every sequence
s ∈ Sk. A simple example with k = 3 and (o0,o1,o2,o3) = (1,1,1,1) is depicted in
Figure 2. Both V and U are partitioned into k + 1 groups V = V0 ∪ V1 ∪···∪Vk
and U = U0 ∪ U1 ∪···∪Uk. The permissible set of every u ∈ Ui is Vi ∪ Vi+1 for
i = 0,1,...,k − 1, and Vk for i = k. We choose the cardinalities of Ui and Vi,
i = 0,1,...,k − 1, as follows. Let xs ∈ N be an integer speciﬁed below. We set
|Uk|=xs · ok and |Uk−1|=xs(k − ok). The remaining cardinalities are determined
by two recursion formulas: Let |Vi|=| Ui|/oi for i = k,...,1,0; and let |Ui|=
(i + 1) ·| Vi+1|=(i + 1)/(oi+1) ·| Ui+1| for i = k − 2,...,1,0. The solution to
this recursion gives |Vk|=xs and |Vi|=xs((k − ok)/(ok−1))
	k−2
j=i (j + 1)/(oj+1), for
i = 0,1,...,k − 1. We choose xs to be the minimum positive real number such that
every |Vi| is an integer.
Since the sequence (o0,o1,...,ok) is monotone increasing, an optimal solution Mopt
assigns every client of Ui to a server in Vi, and every server of Vi has load oi, for
i = 0,1,...,k. We next describe a Nash solution Mnash: It assigns every job in Ui to a
server in Vi+1 for i = 0,1,...,k − 1; and it assigns every job in Uk to a server in Vk.
Every server in Vi has load ni = i for i = 0,1,...,k.5
For k = 7 and (o0,o1,...,o7) = (1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2), we apply the above recur-
sion formulas with the minimum integer x = 4. We obtain (|V0|,|V1|,...,|V7|) =
(1800,1800,900,300,75,30,10,4), a total of 4919 servers. The social costs in the two
solutions are cost(Mopt) =
7
i=0 |Vi|·o2
i = 5276 and cost(Mnash) =
7
i=0 |Vi|·i2 =
10,606; so the price of anarchy is 2 + 27/2638 > 2.01.
We have presented a lower-bound construction with k = 7 from a general family
of instances. A natural question is how far can this construction be pushed? We have
systematically tested all instances in this family up to k = 29. The construction ﬁrst
yields a lower bound strictly larger than 2 for k = 6. The price of anarchy then increases
slowly and monotonically with k, reaching 2.01206694843168 when k = 29. With such
5 In the simple case where oi = 1 for all i’ s ,w eh a v ex = 1, and it is easy to verify that cost(Mopt) = n, and
cost(Mnash) = 2n − 1. This relatively simple construction gives a lower bound of 2−1/n, which is slightly
below 2.90 S. Suri, Cs. D. T´ oth, and Y. Zhou
aslowrateofgrowth,itseemsunlikelytousthatthisconstructionwillyieldasigniﬁcant
improvement over 2.01. In fact, we conjecture that an upper bound of the ratio using this
construction is 2.0121.
4. Price of Anarchy with the Lp Norm. In this section we consider higher order
monomial latency functions, and use the Lp norm to measure the cost of an assignment.
For any constant p ≥ 1, we assume that a server with load   and speed σ has latency
 p−1/σ. Thus, each of the  j clients matched with server j incurs latency λj =  
p−1
j /σj.
The Lp norm measure of the total latency is (
n
i=1 λi)1/p = (
m
j=1  
p
j /σj)1/p. The case
p = 1 is the extreme case where a server’s latency is independent of its load—in such
a case all Nash equilibria are optimal. Thus, the interesting cases are only when p > 1.
Our main result in this section shows that the price of anarchy with this latency measure
is (p/log p)(1 + o(1)). (By comparison, the greedy scheme of Awerbuch et al. [4],
discussed in the next section, has competitive ratio cp(1 + o(1)) where c ≈ 1.77.)
THEOREM 4.1. With the Lp norm latency measure and arbitrary server speeds, the
price of anarchy is bounded by cost(Mnash)/cost(Mopt) ≤ (p/log p)(1 + o(1)).
PROOF. Let Mnash be a Nash assignment and let Mopt be an optimal assignment, then
cost(Mnash) = (

j n
p
j /σj)1/p and cost(Mopt) = (

j o
p
j /σj)1/p. Suppose that there ex-
istsaconstantcp,forﬁxed p > 1,suchthatcost(Mnash) ≤ cp cost(Mopt),or,equivalently,
m 
j=1
n
p
j
σj
≤ (cp)p
m 
j=1
o
p
j
σj
⇔ p
m 
j=1
n
p
j
σj
≤ (p − 1)
m 
j=1
n
p
j
σj
+ (cp)p
m 
j=1
o
p
j
σj
. (9)
We have the following chain of inequalities:
m 
j=1
n
p
j
σj
=
m 
j=1
n
p−1
j
σj
m 
k=1
|Nj ∩ Ok|=
m 
k=1
m 
j=1
n
p−1
j
σj
|Nj ∩ Ok| (10)
≤
m 
k=1
m 
j=1
(nk + 1)p−1
σk
|Nj ∩ Ok|=
m 
k=1
(nk + 1)p−1ok
σk
.
In the above chain of inequalities, we used the fact that (n
p−1
j /σj)|Nj ∩ Ok|≤((nk +
1)p−1/σk)|Nj ∩ Ok| for all j,k. This is trivial if Nj ∩ Ok =∅ ; otherwise, the derivation
is similar to Nash Condition (1). Due to (10), in order for (9) to hold it is sufﬁcient to
prove the following:
p
m 
j=1
(nj + 1)p−1oj
σj
≤ (p − 1)
m 
j=1
n
p
j
σj
+ (cp)p
m 
j=1
o
p
j
σj
.
In fact, we prove the following much stronger inequality:
p(nj + 1)p−1oj ≤ (p − 1)n
p
j + (cp)po
p
j , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m. (11)Selﬁsh Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games 91
If oj = 0, (11) is trivially true. Thus we assume that oj ≥ 1. We rewrite (11) as
follows:
p

nj
oj
+
1
oj
p−1
− (p − 1)

nj
oj
p
≤ (cp)p. (12)
Let f (x) ≡ p(x + 1)p−1 − (p − 1)x p,x ∈ [0,∞). Since 1/oj ≤ 1, it follows that
the left side of (12) is bounded by f (nj/oj). It is easy to see that f (x) is bounded above.
Let the maximum value of f (x) be f (x0) where x0 ≥ 0, and set (cp)p = f (x0). Since
x0 is an extreme point, it follows that f  (x0) = 0, which means that
p(p − 1)(x0+1)p−2−p(p−1)(x0)p−1=0, i.e., (x0+1)p−2=(x0)p−1. (13)
It is easy to derive from (13) the following bound on x0: x0 = (p/log p)(1 + o(1)).
Now we can bound the value of cp as follows:
cp =


p(x0 + 1)p−1 − (p − 1)(x0)p1/p
=


p(x0 + 1)(x0)p−1 − (p − 1)(x0)p1/p
= x0

p

1 +
1
x0

− (p − 1)
1/p
= x0

1 +
p
x0
1/p
≤ (1 + p)1/px0 =
p
log p
(1 + o(1)).
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5. AnalysisoftheGreedyScheme. Thecostofanassignmentisrelatedtothesquared
sum of the server loads. An elegant result of Awerbuch et al. [4] shows that a simple
online greedy scheme achieves competitive ratio (1 +
√
2)2 ≈ 5.83 for this measure of
centralizedloadbalancing.Thegreedyschemeassignseachclienttoapermissibleserver
so as to minimize the increase in the total objective. Speciﬁcally, a client is assigned to
server j that minimizes the quantity ( j + 1)2/σj −  2
j/σj = (2 j + 1)/σj.
The greedy scheme does not, in general, lead to equilibrium assignments. However,
it does have a computational advantage—it is easy to implement. While the greedy
policy above is designed for optimizing the social welfare, it is also a natural selﬁsh
strategy. Each client is essentially choosing the best possible server at the time it makes
itsselection.Whenallservershaveequalspeed,eachclientissimplychoosingtheserver
with the minimum load. With arbitrary speeds, the greedy scheme asks each client to
choose the server j that minimizes ( j + 0.5)/σj; a true selﬁsh strategy for the client
would minimize ( j + 1)/σj. This minor change in the priority has a minuscule effect
on our bounds.
In this section we reanalyze the greedy scheme and present improved bounds on its
competitive ratio. The basis for our analysis is the following Greedy Inequality:
LEMMA 5.1 (Greedy Inequality). Ifservershavearbitraryspeedsandthelatencyfunc-
tion is linear, then the following holds for an optimal assignment Mopt and any greedy92 S. Suri, Cs. D. T´ oth, and Y. Zhou
assignment Mgreedy, where oj =| Oj|,gj =| Gj|, and Oj (resp. Gj) is the set of clients
assigned to server j in Mopt (resp. Mgreedy):
m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
2gjoj + oj
σj
. (14)
PROOF. Suppose the clients arrive in the order 1,2,...,n. Let Xi = (xi1,...,xim)
denotetheassignmentvectorfortheclienti in Mgreedy,andletYi = (yi1,...,yim)denote
theassignmentvectorfori in Mopt,wherexij, yij ∈{ 0,1}and
m
j=1 xij =
m
j=1 yij = 1.
We use Li = ( i1,...,  im) to denote the load vector for the greedy scheme after the
ﬁrst i clients have been assigned, for i = 0,...,n. Notice that L0 = (0,...,0) and
Ln = (g1,...,gm). Since the greedy scheme minimizes the total increase in the latency
at each step, we have
m 
j=1
 2
ij
σj
−
m 
j=1
 2
i−1,j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
( i−1,j + yij)2
σj
−
m 
j=1
 2
i−1,j
σj
=
m 
j=1
y2
ij + 2yij i−1,j
σj
.
Summing up these increments for i from 1 to n,w eg e t
m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
n 
i=1
m 
j=1
y2
ij + 2yij i−1,j
σj
=
m 
j=1
n 
i=1
yij(yij + 2 i−1,j)
σj
≤
m 
j=1
n 
i=1
yij(1 + 2gj)
σj
=
m 
j=1
(2gj + 1)oj
σj
.
In the above chain of inequalities, we used the fact that  i−1,j ≤ gj and yij ≤ 1 for
all i, j,

i yij = oj for all j. The proof is complete.
With the Greedy Inequality, we can prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.2. With linear latency functions, the ratio of a greedy solution to the opti-
malsolutionisatmost4+o(1)assumingthatn   m andtheserverspeedsarerelatively
bounded. Formally, we have the following:
cost(Mgreedy)
cost(Mopt)
≤ 4 +
m +
m
j=1 σj
m
j=1 1/σj
n
(15)
≤ 4 +

1 +

max
1≤j,k≤m
σj
σk

m
n
.
PROOF. By using the Greedy Inequality (14) and the fact that 2gjoj ≤ 1
2g2
j + 2o2
j,w e
get
m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
2gjoj + oj
σj
≤
m 
j=1
1
σj

g2
j
2
+ 2o2
j + oj

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m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
4o2
j + 2oj
σj
,
cost(Mgreedy)
cost(Mopt)
=
m
j=1 g2
j /σj
m
j=1 o2
j/σj
≤ 4 + 2
m
j=1 oj/σj
m
j=1 o2
j/σj
.
By Lemma 2.3, we get the desired result immediately.
For arbitrary values of n,m and arbitrary server speeds, our second theorem gives an
upper bound of 17/3 ≈ 5.67, which is a slight improvement over the (
√
2+1)2 ≈ 5.83
bound proved in [4].
THEOREM 5.3. If servers have arbitrary speeds and the latency function is linear, then
the following bound holds: cost(Mgreedy)/cost(Mopt) ≤ 17/3. Formally, we have
m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
17
3
m 
j=1
o2
j
σj
.
PROOF. It is easy to verify the following equality:
2gjoj = 2
5g2
j + 5
2o2
j − 2
5(gj − 5
2oj)2.
From Lemma 5.1, we know that
m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
2gjoj + oj
σj
=
m 
j=1
1
σj
(2
5g2
j + 5
2o2
j − 2
5(gj − 5
2oj)2 + oj),
m 
j=1
g2
j
σj
≤
m 
j=1
1
σj
(25
6 o2
j + 5
3oj − 2
3(gj − 5
2oj)2).
In order to prove
m
j=1 g2
j /σj ≤ (17/3)
m
j=1 o2
j/σj, it is sufﬁcient to show that
25
6
o2
j +
5
3
oj −
2
3

gj −
5oj
2
2
≤
17
3
o2
j, for all j = 1,...,m.
The above inequality can be simpliﬁed to the following:
9
4oj(10
9 − oj) ≤ (gj − 5
2oj)2.
This inequality is obviously true if oj = 0o roj ≥ 2. Since oj is an integer, there is
only one remaining case oj = 1, where the inequality simpliﬁes to 1
4 ≤ (gj − 5
2)2. This
holds because gj is an integer. This completes the proof.
5.1. AnImprovedBoundforServersofEqualSpeed. Ifallservershavethesamespeed
then we can further improve the upper bound for the greedy scheme. First, Theorem 5.2
implies that cost(Mgreedy)/cost(Mopt) ≤ 4 + 2m/n. Thus, the competitive ratio of the
greedy scheme approaches 4 as m/n → 0; in practice, this is not a bad assumption
since the number of clients often far exceeds the number of servers. A more complicated
analysis gives an upper bound of 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.24 for arbitrary m, n.94 S. Suri, Cs. D. T´ oth, and Y. Zhou
THEOREM 5.4. If all servers have the same speed and the latency function is linear,
then the ratio cost(Mgreedy)/cost(Mopt) is at most 2 +
√
5.
PROOF. In order to prove the inequality cost(Mgreedy) ≤ (2 +
√
5)cost(Mopt),i ti s
enough to prove the following:
√
5 + 1
2
cost(Mgreedy) ≤
√
5 − 1
2
cost(Mgreedy) + (2 +
√
5)cost(Mopt). (16)
Lemma5.1,togetherwiththefactσj = 1and

j oj = n,impliesthatcost(Mgreedy) ≤
n + 2
m
j=1 ojgj. To prove (16), it sufﬁces to show the following:
√
5 + 1
2

n + 2
m 
j=1
ojgj

≤
m 
j=1

(2 +
√
5)o2
j +
√
5 − 1
2
g2
j

, (17)
and it is equivalent to
n ≤
m 
j=1

3 +
√
5
2
o2
j +
3 −
√
5
2
g2
j − 2ojgj

(18)
=
m 
j=1
√
5 + 1
2
oj −
√
5 − 1
2
gj
2
.
Let xj = ((
√
5 + 1)/2)oj −((
√
5 − 1)/2)gj, then (18) is equivalent to the following:
n ≤
m 
j=1
x2
j , with
m 
j=1
xj =
√
5 + 1
2
m 
j=1
oj −
√
5 − 1
2
m 
j=1
gj = n. (19)
We prove (19) by induction on m. The inductive proof is similar to the proof of (8)
in Theorem 3.3 and we omit the details. This completes the proof.
5.2. Some Lower Bounds. The bound of Theorem 5.4 is the best possible using only
the Greedy Inequality. Consider the following example: There are a pairs of (1,0),
k pairs of (1,1) and one pair of (b,a + b). Let k = (a − b − 1)(a + b)/2, then m
j=1 g2
j = 2
m
j=1 ojgj + n with n = a + b + k.N o w
m
j=1 g2
j m
j=1 o2
j
=
k + (a + b)2
a + b2 + k
=
3a2 + b2 + 4ab− (a + b)
a2 + b2 + a − b
.
Let b/a approximate (
√
5 − 1)/2. As a goes to inﬁnity, the above ratio approaches
2 +
√
5.
The following theorem establishes that the cost of the greedy scheme is strictly more
than three times the optimal in the worst case.
THEOREM 5.5. Intheworstcase,cost(Mgreedy)/cost(Mopt) ≥ 3+ 1
12 ≈ 3.08,evenwith
equal speed servers and linear latency functions.Selﬁsh Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games 95
PROOF. Consider the bipartite graph G = (U,V) with n =| U|=66 and m =| V|=
64. The edge set is deﬁned as E ={ (ui,vj) | j ≥ min{i,64}}.
The cost of an optimal assignment, which assigns job i to server min{i,64},i s
cost(Mopt) = 63 + 9 = 72. One worst-case greedy assignment maps each client
1,2,...,64 to a permissible server minimizing the increase in L2 norm, it breaks
ties by choosing the server with higher index. Its cost amounts to cost(Mgreedy) =
16+8·22+4·32+2·42+1·52+1·92 = 222.Thus,theratiocost(Mgreedy)/cost(Mopt) =
3 + 1
12 ≈ 3.08 > 3.
6. Closing Remarks. The users of a decentralized systems like the Internet are some-
times best modeled as selﬁsh and strategic players, who want to optimize their own
private utility. Our selﬁsh load balancing game models one such fundamental situation,
where a set of clients must each choose a server. We showed that the worst-case Nash
solution of this game is within a small constant factor of the social optimum.
Thesumoftheclients’latencyisrelatedtothesquaredsumoftheserverloads.Inthat
respect, our problem can also be viewed as the uncoordinated version of the classical
L2 norm load balancing [4]. We reanalyzed the simple online greedy scheme and gave
improved bounds on its competitive ratio.
The uncoordinated greedy scheme can also be viewed as a myopic strategy for the
clients: they choose the best server available when they arrive and are not allowed to
switch afterwards. By contrast, a Nash solution requires that clients reach a stable point,
wherenoclienthasanincentivetoswitch.Ouranalysisshowsthat,despitelackofcentral
coordination, selﬁsh players ﬁnd solutions that are better than the greedy scheme, which
assumes centralized control but non-selﬁsh players.
Interestingly, the Nash and the greedy schemes can be viewed as two extremes of
a server switching cost model—in greedy, the cost to switch is inﬁnite; in Nash, it is
zero.Anintriguingopenquestionistoinvestigatethetradeoffsofaﬁniteswitchingcost.
Another open question relates to the effect of server speeds. Our upper bounds are better
for equal speed servers, but we know of no lower-bound construction that gives a worse
solutionforarbitraryspeedsthanequalspeeds.Doarbitraryspeedshelporhurttheprice
of anarchy? Finally, there remains a small gap between our upper and lower bounds for
the equal speed servers, and it would be interesting to determine where the truth lies.
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